PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As

MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

BANKRUPTCY.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, holds In re International Mahogany Co. 147
Fed. 147 that where a bankrupt corporation
Detectivo
Mortgage
prior to its bankruptcy, to secure an issue of
bonds had executed a mortgage on lands in Cuba which
had there been filed for registry but not recorded owing
to a technical defect, the court will not enjoin the
directors from authorizing .the execution and delivery of
a curative mortgage after bankruptcy, it appearing that
under the law of Cuba the mortgage will be valid from
the date of the entry in the recorder's books of the fact
of its presentation, if the defect is corrected and the
instrument is thereafter duly recorded; the trustee in
bankruptcy having no greater right to object to the correction than the general creditors would have had if the
bankruptcy had not intervened. Compare In re New
York Economical PrintingCo., ino Fed., 514 .
The United States District Court, S. D., New York,
decides In re Tiffany, 147 Fed., 314, that where a state
Withholdi.,
Discharge

statute gives judgment creditors the right to

proceed in equity to reach surplus income of
the debtor in case of certain trusts, which cannot be
reached by execution, but does not give such right to a
trustee in bankruptcy, a court of bankruptcy may, in
its discretion, when equity requires it, delay the granting
of a discharge to a bankrupt and permit judgment creditors, whose judgments would be extinguished by the
discharge, to institute and prosecute suits under such
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BANKRUPTCY (Coritinued).

statute, to reach income derived by the bankrupt from
a trust estate, for their own benefit. Compare Lockwood
v. lExcinge Bank, 190 U. S., 294.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, decides In re Dresser, 146 Fed., 383, that the
fact that the refusal of a bankrupt to answer
Discharge:
material questions in the course of the promt*
toteAusw
Answer
Questions

ceedings which were approved by the referee

was based on the claim of his constitutional privilege
not to incriminate himself does not deprive the court of
the right to deny him a discharge because of such refusal,
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and its amendments.

BANKS AND BANKING.

In Daugherty et al v. Poundstone, 96 S. W., 728, the
Kansas City Court of Appeals of Missouri decides that
the Trustees of a dissolved banking corpora-Rpe~ay=e.t
oiv ide

tion cannot maintain a suit against a stock-

holder to recover a dividend, which should have been
applied to a judgment obtained against the trustees by a
depositor for the amount of a deposit paid by the disbursing officers on unauthorized checks, until they have
exhausted their remedy against the culpable officers and
their securities.
It is decided by the Supreme Court of North Dakota
in FirstNat. Bank of Portage v. State Bank of Northwood
et al., 1o9 N. W., 61, that although a certifiCertificates
of De-posit
Interest

cate of deposit payable on demand after a

stated 'period contains a stipulation that it

shall not bear interest after maturity, the holder thereof
is entitled to legal interest thereon from the date when the
bank fails or refuses to meet a demand of payment when
payment is due.
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BANKS AND BANKING (Continued).

The United States Circuit Court, E. D., Pennsylvania,
decides in Eastcrn Milling & Export Co. v. Eastern Millng 6' Export Co. of Pennsylvania, 146 Fed.,
Application
of Deposit:
761, that the right given to a bank by a conReceivership
tract with a depositing and borrowing corporation to declare any notes of the corporation held by the
bank due in case the corporation became insolvent, and
to apply thereon any sum then on deposit to the corporation's credit, cannot be exercised after a rceiver has
been appointed for the corporation, since title to the
deposit passed to him at once on his appointment. Compare Chipinan& Holt v. Ninth National Bank, 120 Pa., 86.
The Supreme Court of Iowa decides in Sherwood v.
Home Savuing Bank, 1o9 N. W., o, that where, in an
Localcustom: action against a bank for loss of securities

Evidence
intrusted to it for safe-keeping, the bank
pleaded that the securities had been misappropriated
by its cashier, without fault on its part, and that it was
beyond the bank's powers so to receive the securities,
evidence that it was the local custom of banks to receive
valuable papers for customers was admissible as bearing
on the bank's powers as well as on the cashier's authority
so to act for the bank. Compare Wing v. Commercial

Savings Bank, 61 N.W., xoo9.
CARRIERS.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides in Illinois
Cent. R. Co. v. Cruse, 96 S.W., 821, that it not being the
Duty to Assist duty of the employees of a carrier to assist
Psengers a passenger in alighting, because of her sickness or other misfortune, unless such condition is known
to them, it is error to charge that it was their duty to
assist her if her feebleness was known to them, '!or was

apparent," this implying that it was their duty to observe her condition to see whether she needed assistance.
Compare .herewith Yarnell v. Kansas.City &c. R.R. Co.,
113 Mo., 570, 18 L.R.A., 599.
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In Gray v. Wanash R. Co., 95 S.-V., 983, the Kansas

City Court of Appeals, decides that proof that cars containing plaintiff's property were placed on
Acceptance
of FreiZht
defendant railroad's connecting track, the
usual place of delivery of freight destined for it as connecting carrier, under an arrangement with other roads
that freight so placed would be accepted for further
transportation, did not amount to an acceptance until
defendant took actual charge of the property, accepted
the bill of lading, or performed some other acts amounting in law to an acceptance.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina holds in Laurens
v. Anderson, 55 S. E., 136, that a statute exempting
Confederate veterans who enlisted from the
Unjust D,.
crinlation

state from any license for carrying on business

within the state, is unconstitutional, as providing only
for soldiers and sailors who enlisted from the state, and
ignoring veterans of other wars, as well as soldiers of the
confederacy who enlisted from other states, in that it
deprives persons within the jurisdiction of the state of
the equal protection of the laws.
In Omaha Water Co. v. City of Omaha et al., 147 Fed., i,
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth
Circuit, decides that the power of a city to
municipal
contracts

regulate or fix the rates which a water, gas,

or railway company may collect of private consumers
partakes of the nature of a governmental power and also
of the nature of a business power and that, therefore,
the Legislature of a state unless prohibited by its Constitution may empower a city to suspend by contract,
and a city may suspend in that way for a reasonable
term of years, its power to fix or regulate the rates which
a third party may collect of private consumers. An
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agreement as to the schedule of rates for an unreasonable
time could it seems be modified without violation of the
constitutional inhibition against impairing the obligation of contracts.
In Northern Assurance Conipany of London v. Grand
View Building Association, 27 S.C.R., 27, the United
States Supreme Court decides that a judgFull Faith
ment of the Supreme Court of the United
and Credit
States to the effect that a policy of fire insurance could not be recovered upon as it stood nor be
helped out by any doctrine of the common law is not
denied full faith and credit by an adjudication of a state
court that such judgment is not a bar to a suit in equity
to reform the policy so that it will express consent to
concurrent insurance, and to recover upon such policy
as reformed. Compare Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Norwood, 16 C.C.A. 136.

CONTEMPT.

In United States v. Collins, 146 Fed., 553, the United
States District Court, D. Oregon, decides that where
Commitment: accused was committed for contempt for his
Exfr-t o- refusal to appear as a witness before a grand
Order
jury and there produce certain records, etc.,
in response to a subpoena duces tecum, the term during which he could be imprisoned under such order
expired on the discharge of the grand jury. It is held,
however, that where accused was in prison for his
refusal to obey a subpcena requiring him to appear and
produce records before.a grand jury, and he remained
recalcitrant until after the grand jury was discharged,
he was not thereby purged of his contempt and was
subject to sentence to imprisonment for a specified term.
Compare Ex parte Maulsby, i3 Md., 625.
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CONTRACTS.

In Rathfon v. Locher, 215 Pa., 571, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decides that a promissory note given by
a married woman as surety for her husband's
Notes:
.Moral..
debt, although legally invalid, imports a
Consideration moral consideration,
which will be sufficient
to support a renewal note given by the married woman
after her husband's death; and this is the case although
the renewal note was of a date prior to the husband's
death, if it appears that there was no fraud in the
transaction. In this connection see Brooks v. Merchants'
National Bank, 125 Pa., 394.
CRIMINAL LAW.

In Wooley v. State, 96 S. W., 27, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas decides that comments by jurors
.Mionduct in a prosecution for seduction on the failure
of Jury
of the defendant to take the stand as a witness in his own behalf are ground for new trial. Compare Thorpe v. State 4o Tex., Cr. R., 346.
DEEDS.

The Supreme Court of Michigan in Leonard v. Leonard
et al., io8 N.W., 985, decides that where a deed in the
Testamoy form of a statutory warranty deed contained
Instrument,

a clause that it was not to be operative until

after the death of the grantors, and the depositary was
instructed to care for the deed until after the grantors'
death and then deliver the same to the grantee, it was a
testamentary instrument, and subject to revocation during the life of either of the grantors. Applying this
general rule it is decided that where such a deed was
placed in the hands of a depositary for safe keeping, to
be delivered on the grantors' death, the record of the
deed by such depositary after the death of one of the
grantors only did not change the character of the instrument,,so as to make it effective to pass a present interest
in the property. See in this connection Pennington v.
Pennington, 75 Mich., 6oo.
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DIVORCE.

In New Jersey it is provided by statute that if in a
suit for divorce for adultery it appears that both parties
have been guilty of adultery, no divorce should
Aduiery:
Condonation be decreed.
In Storms v. Storms, 64 AtI.,
700, it is held, however, by the Court of Chancery of
New Jersey, that, where a husband had commited adultery and his offense had been condoned, he was not
"guilty of adultery" within the law referred to, so as
to preclude him from a divorce for the subsequent adultery of his wife. The propriety of the decision is obvious.
In Halloway v. Halloway, 55 S.E., 191, the Supreme
Court of Georgia decides that the conviction of a married
Imprisonamet: person of an offense involving moral turpiPardon
tude, followed by a sentence of imprisonment
in the penitentiary of two years or longer, gives to the
other party to the marriage a right to a divorce; and this
right is not affected by an executive pardon granted
after the sentence has been imposed. Compare State v
Duket, 63 N.W., 83, 31 L.R.A., 5r5.
EVIDENCE.

In Porter v. Buckley et al., 147 Fed., 140, the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, decides
that it is competent for an ordinary witness
Opinion:
speed an
to express an opinion as to thetime,
Speed of
which
Automobiles
automobile was making at a given
is not, strictly speaking, a scientific inquiry, the weight
of such opinion being for the jury.
EXCHANGES.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth
Circuit, decides in McDearmott Commission Co. et al. v.
Board of Trade of City
ih
tae of Chicago, 146 Fed.,
Property in
Market

Quotations

96z, that a board of trade, which has a right

of property in market quotations collected in

its exchange, does not surrender or dedicate them to

PROGRESS

OF THE LAW.

EXCHANGES (Continued).

the public by permitting subscribers, to whom they are
communicated upon condition that they shall not be
made public, to post 'them upon blackboards in their
places of business, where the posting is done for the advantage of the subscribers, and not of the public, and
does not make knowledge of the quotations general, or
make them accessible to the public as of right, or render
them of no further value. See note to Sullivan v.
Postal Tel. Cable Co., 61 C.C.A., '2.

GARNISHMENT.

In Davis v. Cleveland C., C. & St. L. R. Co., 146 Fed.,
403, the United States Circuit Court, N.D. Iowa, W.D.,
Iht oey holds that sums due to a railroad company
D. Nore. from other companies as its share of freight
dent Carriercollected by them as the terminal or final
carriers on continuous interstate shipments are not subject to attachment by garnishment of the debtors under
the foreign attachment laws of another state in which
the defendant cannot be personally sued. The case
presents also an interesting discussion of the attachment
of railroad cars. Compare Central Trust Co. v. Railway
Co., 68 Fed., 685.
GRAND JURY.

In Lyon v. Con monwealth, 96 S.W., 857, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky decides that a statutory provision
secrecy

that no person except the attorney for the
commonwealth and the witness under exami-

nation shall be present while the grand jury are examining
a charge, and no person whatever while they are deliberating or voting on a charge, does not prohibit the admission of an interpreter before the grand jury for the
examination of witnesses, whose evidence could not be
otherwise made intelligible to the grand jury.
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INSURANCE.

The Supreme Court of Georgia holds in Ogletree v.
Hutchinson, 55 S.E., 179, that a stipulation in a policy
stiplatn.: of life insurance that payment of the amount
Is nCiary of the policy to any relative of the insured

belonging to a designated class will discharge the company from liability is valid, but such a stipulation does
not have the effect to make the person actually receiving
the money thereunder the -beneficiary of .the policy.
It is merely an appointment, by the parties to the contract, of a person who may collect the amount due under
the policy for the benefit of the person ultimately entitled thereto. Compare Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Schaffer, 50 N.J. Law,

72.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi holds in Grand
Lodge &c. v. Smith et al., 42 So., 89, that where insured
was coerced into a marriage, and never therea fter cohabited or visited his pretended wife,
she was not his widow, within the terms of an insurance
certificate, payable to insured's "widow or other heirs."
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
2 K. B., 555, it
appeared that a bailiff, employed to levy a distress for
Distress: Tres.- rent in arrear, illegally broke in the front
pass ab initlo door; he then seized the furniture, but before
selling it left the house, and, being refused admittance
on his return, made no attempt to regain possession.
Subsequently the landlord put in a fresh distress in respect
of the same rent by a different bailiff acting under a fresh
distress warrant, who seized the furniture, which was
replevied before sale by the owner. Under these facts
the Court of Appeals decides that the proceeding under
the first distress .warrant was a trespass ab initio and
void as a distress, and that the landlord, having had no
opportunity of satisfying his claim for rent by means of
that proceeding, could lawfully distrain under the second

;@In Grunnell v. Welch, L.R., (i9o6),
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. warrant for the same rent. Compare with this decision
Attack v. Bramwell, 3 B. & S.,

520.

MAINTENANCE.

The Kansas City Court of Appeals of Missouri decides
in Phelps v. Mfanicko et al., 96 S.W., 221 that where
plaintiff, who was not an attorney, agreed
What
Constitutes to take up plaintiff's cause of action against
defendant, employ lawyers, get up evidence at his own
expense and conduct the litigation to a termination,
the contract was void for maintenance. See also Gilbert
v. Holmes, 64 Ill., 548.
MASTER

AND

SERVANT.

The Supreme Court of Washington decides in Berg v.
Seattle R. 6 S. Co., 87 Pac., 34, that the motorman and
conductor of one car on a street railroad, the
Fellow
Servants

cars of which run on schedule time, are fel-

low servants of the motorman and conductor of another
car on the line, so that one of the motormen injured
through the negligence of the other motorman in not
performing his duty of turning on the lights of a blocklight system, and of the conductor of the other car in
not performing his duty to see that his motorman performed such duty, cannot recover from the company.
Compare Grimm v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 84 Pac.,
635.
MERGER.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decides in Frank
v. Guarantee Trust &' Safe Deposit Co., 216 Pa., 40, that
where an owner of a ground rent purchases
Olround
the ground itself and subsequently executes
Rents:
niortgag,
a mortgage without indicating an intention
in the mortgage to prevent a merger of the rent in the
title to the land, and thereafter executes an assignment
of the ground rents to another person, one who takes
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title under foreclosure of the mortgage takes the fee in
the land with the ground rents extinguished, and the
assignee of the ground rents takes nothing by his assignment. Two judges dissent. Compare Ames v. Miller,
91 N.W., 250.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

In Wheeler v. City of Ft. Dodge, io8 N.W., 1057, the
Supreme Court of Iowa decides that a wire stretched
from the roof of a building downward and
Negligenc€

outward across the street, and ending at a

pole to which it is fastened, though stretched pursuant
to the consent of the municipality, and though through
most of its course it is high above the heads of people
using the walks and carriageways, is a nuisance because
an obstruction of the street, the public right extending
indefinitely upward, especially in view of the fact that
it was stretched for the purpose of using it for a dangerous performance. It is further held that where a city
permitted a wire to be so stretched it became chargeable
with notice of the nuisance created by the wire the moment of its erection, and became in legal effect the creator of the nuisance substantially the same as if the structure was one of its own making. See Callananv. Gilman,
14 N.E., 267.
PARTIES.

An interesting decision as to the limfts within which
a cause of action may be amended appears in Hackett
et al. v. Van Frank, 96 S.W., 247, where the
PleadIng:
Amcndnent
St. Louis Court of Appeals of Missouri, decides that where suit on a cause of action in favor of a
corporation was commenced in the names of the owners
of all the corporate stock, an amendment substituting
the corporation as party plaintiff should have been
allowed, and was not objectionable as changing the
cause of action. See also Lilly v. Tobbeik, 103 Mo., 447.
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PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

In Berry et al. v. Chase, 146 Fed., 625, the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, decides
that one who has dealt with an agent cannot
Liability to
Third arty
upon discovery of an undisclosed principal
hold both the agent and the principal liable on the contract, but must elect between the two, and, an election
once made, he must abide by it. Compare Fradley v.
Hyland, 37 Fed., 49.

RECORDS.

An interesting case with respect to the publication of
the decision of appellate courts appears in Ex parte
n

Cour O

Brown, 78 N.E., 553, where it is held that a

publisher has not the unrestricted and unconditional right of access to the opinions and decisions
of the Supreme Court to make copies for publication,
the clerk having the right and duty to control by reasonable rules the inspection and handling of the records of
his office. Compare Banks & Bro. v. West Publishing
Co., 27

Fed., 50.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

hI McMillan et al. v. Noyes et al., 146 Fed., 926, the
United States Circuit Court, D. New Hampshire, decides
that in a suit to enjoin the destruction of a
Separable
Controversy

water privilege by diverting water from a

stream, the complainant may properly join as defendants the persons who are undertaking such diversion
and one with whom they have contracted to do the work,
and ask for a common injunction against all, and in such
case there is no separable controversy which entitles
the former to remove the cause when the contractor
could not. See notes to Robbins v. Ellenbogen, 18 C.C.A.,
86 and to Mecke v. Valleytown Mineral Co., 35 C.C.A.,
155.
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TAXATION

In Buckner v. Sugg, 96 S.W., 185, the Supreme Court
of Arkansas decides that in taxation proceedings the
description of the land must be such as fully
Decrlptlon
of Lau
apprises the owner without recourse to the
superior knowledge peculiar to him as owner that the
particular tract of his land is sought to be charged with
a tax lien. It is held, however, that in determining the
sufficiency of the description of land in tax proceedings,
extrinsic evidence is admissible to connect the land with
the description used in the assessment list and other
tax proceedings. Compare Kcely v. Sanders, 99 U. S.,
44'.

TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE NAMES.

Two interesting cases relating to the "Buster Brown"
illustrations in newspapers appear in New York Herald
Co. v. Star Co. 146 Fed., 204, and Outcalt v.
Unfatr
Competition

New York Herald, 146 Fed.,

205.

In the

first of these cases it is held that complainant is entitled
to protection in the trade-mark "Buster Brown" as the
title of a comic section of a newspaper, it being shown
that it was the first to use the title, and that it was so
used exclusively by complainant and its licensees for such
length of time as to give it a proprietary right therein.
Whereas in the second case the same Court (United
States Circuit Court, S. D. New York) decides that an
artist has no such common-law right in pictures drawn
by him and sold to another, who published and copyrighted the same, as to render it unfair competition
in trade for the latter to afterwards publish other
pictures depicting different scenes merely because
they contain characters in imitation of those in the earlier
ones. Compare notes to Scheuer v. Mu!ler, 2o C.C.A.
165, and to Lare v. Harper & Bros., 30 C.C.A.,
376.
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TRADES UNIONS.

An interesting decision is made by the English Court
of King's Bench, in Burke v. Amalgamated Society of
inity of
Membo,

Dyers, L.R., (i9o6), 2 K.B., 583, where it is
held that the alteration by a trades union,

during the insanity of a member, of a rule as to sick
benefits, to the prejudice of that member, is binding
upon him if made in accordance with the rule authorizing
and regulating the alteration of the rules of the union.
Compare Smith v. Galloway, L.R. (1898) 1 Q.B., 71.
TRESPASS.

In State v. Shevlin-CarpentcrCo., io8 N.W., 935, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, construing a statute of
the State declaring certain acts of trespass

upon state lands a crime, imposing a p~nalty
therefor and fixing the measure of damages to be recovered
in a civil action, construes the statute as intended to
impose upon a casual or involuntary trespasser criminal
punishment and also double damages for his wrongful
acts, and so construed holds the statute not a deprivation
of property without due process of law. Compare Clark
v. Field, 42 Mich., 342.
TRIAL.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Louisville
Ry. Co. v. Masterson, 96 S. W., 534, that where, during
an adjournment of court during the trial of
n1isconduct
of Jurors
a cause, counsel for plaintiff took a drink with
two of the jurors at the invitation of one of them, but
nothing was said with reference to the case in
question, and defendant's counsel, though he had
knowledge of such fact, proceeded with the trial
until near its completion before he moved that the jury
be discharged because of misconduct, the motion was
properly denied. The case, as will be noted, arose in
Kentucky.
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TRUSTS.

In re Berry et al., 147 Fed., 209, the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, decides that
constructive

where bankrupts deposited money which they

had received from petitioners, under a mistake of fact to the credit of their general bank account,
and though subsequent to such deposit and prior to the
intervention of bankruptcy, withdrawals were made
from the account, the balance was never below the
amount which they received through mistake, it would
be presumed that the amounts withdrawn were not those
impressed with the trust, and that so long as the bankrupt's account equalled or exceeded the amount erroneously received that such amount constituted the trust
fund. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. Hawkins, 74 Fed.,
395, 33 L.R.A., 739.
Trusts

